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English Companies’ Act, 1929 — Cause and
Effect
By John F. Parnaby

November 1, 1929, is a date which will be remembered by all
who are engaged in the accountancy profession in England.
The most important English statutes governing joint-stock
companies had been, up to that time, the companies acts of 1908
to 1917, but as time went on it became increasingly apparent that
this legislation needed revision, and finally a committee was ap
pointed to make an exhaustive examination of the position.
As a result of the recommendations made by this body came
the companies act of 1928, the object of which was merely to
amend the law as it stood.
With the solitary exception of one section, this act, although
passed by parliament, never came into operation, but instead
came an act consolidating such of the old law as was not intended
to be repealed by the 1928 act, and including in their entirety
every one of the new provisions embodied in that act.
The new statute is known officially as the companies act of
1929, and in its character of a new broom sweeping completely
away all previous legislation on the subject, it is worthy of a brief
examination.
To attempt to treat any technical subject in narrative form is
apt to call forth harsh criticism from more exacting students of
that subject, so it may be well at the outset to emphasize that no
endeavor will be made here to convey more than an indication of
the more important changes resulting from the new enactment.
It is a curious fact that, prior to November 1, 1929, when the
new statute took effect, there was apparently no legal obligation
for a company to keep any books of account at all.
Certain it is that the old statutes presupposed accounts, as they
provided for their audit and verification, but this is the first time
that any definite requirement has appeared, and it is now im
perative for every trading company to keep records of cash, sales
and purchases of goods, and of assets and liabilities.
There had previously been no regulations controlling the length
of time which might elapse before a new company exhibited its
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first set of accounts to its members. As might be expected, this
state of affairs led to much comment and complaint from unfortu
nate shareholders who were kept unaware of the progress of their
investments for an undue period, and, more important still, it
paved the way for more than a few successful defalcations.
It is now required that a newly formed company must produce
complete accounts within eighteen months of the date of its incor
poration, and thereafter at least once in every calendar year, and
that such accounts must be laid before a general meeting of the
company held within nine months after the date to which the
accounts are made up.
Many consider that these provisions are still too lenient, and
that owners should be given some statement of their company’s
progress at a much earlier date.
Time alone can show whether this contention is justified or not,
but it is, perhaps, worth remarking that even under this new legis
lation it is apparently possible for a company to prepare its ac
counts on, say, January 31st, and then run right on until Decem
ber 31st of the following year, thus having an unbroken period of
practically two full years.
Another fruitful source of discontent amongst the investing
public had been the growing tendency for published accounts to
become increasingly condensed.
In many cases, even were the shareholder an expert accountant,
the balance-sheet could have conveyed little to him, and this
again, except that reference could be had to the auditor’s report
thereon, made it possible for these statements to become very
misleading. Moreover, often where members inquired, at a
general meeting, into the composition of items appearing in the
accounts submitted to them they would be met with evasive and
unsatisfactory answers.
There was, of course, the obvious argument in support of these
condensed statements. Trade rivals, it was said, might other
wise be enabled to obtain helpful information; but disgruntled
shareholders found little satisfaction in this explanation.
Those responsible for the drafting of the new act are to be con
gratulated on the fact that, while full disclosure is now impera
tive, few, if any, of the advantages of the old policy of secrecy
have been foregone.
Assets, previously permitted to be grouped more or less at will,
must now be distinguished as of either the fixed or floating class.
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Each of the fixed assets must also indicate on what basis its value
has been computed.
The act also specifies a somewhat extensive list of individual
assets, each of which must appear as a distinct item on the bal
ance-sheet of the company which is presented to the members.
Goodwill and loans to directors may be mentioned as two typical
examples of such assets.
But it must not be supposed that, merely on account of the
absence of legal compulsion to the contrary, English companies, as
a whole, had persisted in producing accounts without the desirable
detail included.
This was not so. The vast majority was content to be guided
by the auditors, who for the most part required accounts which
were largely in accordance with the new legal requirements, but it
must be borne in mind that the auditor of an English company is
not in the same position to insist on the particular form of the
accounts he is auditing, as is an auditor engaged in the United
States by the directors of a corporation.
While on the subject of auditors, there are slight changes to be
mentioned.
No person who was a director or any officer of a company could
be the auditor of that company, under the old law, and the same
restriction still holds good. It is extended, however, so that any
person who is a partner or employee of an officer of the company
is also now expressly excluded from eligibility to the auditorship.
The new statute confers upon the auditor an important right in
that he is now entitled to attend any general meeting of the com
pany at which any accounts which he has examined are laid
before the members. And further, if at that meeting he wishes
to make any statement with regard to the accounts he is legally
permitted to do so.
It has already been said that loans to directors constitute one of
those assets which must be separately featured on the balance-sheet.
This regulation, alone, is of no use. On occasion it has been
found that, during the year, directors have borrowed huge sums
of the company’s funds, but just before the end of the fiscal year,
have repaid the whole amount. There would thus be no loans
outstanding at the date of the accounts, and therefore nothing to
arouse suspicion in the minds of the owners. Yet, a few days after
the year-end, the borrowing might recommence, with the same
window-dressing operation in view when the end of the next fiscal
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year came round. To meet the case, therefore, not only the
final balance owing, but also amounts borrowed and repaid during
the period covered by the accounts is required to be disclosed.
On the auditor is laid the duty of ensuring that this information
reaches the shareholders, and if he is unable to get the necessary
detail shown on the accounts he must disclose the position
through the medium of his report.
Before the operation of the 1929 act it was comparatively un
usual to read any published accounts in which the remuneration
of the directors was shown.
It had been felt for some time that on this subject also some
detailed information was often desirable, and provisions are now
in force requiring the total amount of remuneration received by
the directors from the company itself and its subsidiaries to be
shown on the accounts of every company.
Unfortunately, however, much of the advantage of this section
seems to have been lost by reason of a proviso which follows, to
the effect that the emoluments of managing directors and those
directors who hold salaried positions may be excluded from the
aggregate figure which has to be disclosed.
Yet, as if to make up for the shortcomings of this section,
a power is granted to the members of a company. If the holders
of one fourth of the total voting power of the members so demand
in writing, the directors must present to them a statement showing
the aggregate amount received by the directors for each of the
three preceding years. No director is, in this case, permitted
exemption from disclosure, and the complete statement, when
prepared, must be certified as correct by the company’s auditors.
The company, however, can resolve that the statement shall not
be furnished.
A significant new provision, relating to the liability of auditors
and directors, has been given a place in the new act.
It was formerly possible for a company to include in its articles
or by-laws, a provision exempting the directors or auditors from
any liability, even in the event of negligence or breach of duty.
However unbelievable it may appear, one occasionally met
instances where this had been done, and in actual fact one of the
most important company-law cases of recent years involved a
company in whose articles such a provision appeared.
It was from this case that the obvious undesirability of such a
state of affairs first became apparent, and it is now provided that
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any attempt to limit the liability of directors or auditors in the
event of negligence or breach of trust shall be absolutely of no
legal effect.
A curious anomaly which previously existed has now been
corrected by the new statute. Public companies were required
under the 1908 act to file yearly with the registrar of companies a
statement in the form of a balance-sheet, duly audited.
Of course, the intention was that the statement to be filed
should be roughly an abridged version of the company’s latest
balance-sheet, for each respective year.
In the wording of the old act, however, this intention was not
specifically stated, nor was there provided any date to which the
statement must be made up.
Indeed, it is on record that on more than one occasion com
panies presented the same statement for filing year after year,
and, theoretically, this seemed to be all that was literally required.
But such statements were naturally not acceptable to the regis
trar, and occasion has now occurred to remedy the fault. The
statement to be filed must now be a written copy of the last
audited balance-sheet, certified as a true copy, and containing also
a copy of the auditor’s report thereon.
Prior to the passing of the 1929 act, a satisfactory definition of a
subsidiary company had long been wanted.
For the first time in English company law such a definition has
now been supplied, and inasmuch as there are many widelydiffering interpretations put upon the term “subsidiary” it is of
interest to quote the actual definition appearing in the act.
The relevant section is number 127 and it reads as follows:

“1. (Sec. 127.) Where the assets of a company consist in
whole or in part of shares in another company, whether held
directly or through a nominee, and whether that other company
is a company within the meaning of this act or not, and—
“ (a) the amount of the shares so held is, at the time when the
accounts of the holding company are made up, more than 50
per cent. of the issued share capital of that other company, or
such as to entitle the company to more than 50 per cent. of the
voting power in that other company; or
“ (b) the company has power (not being power vested in it by
virtue only of the provisions of a debenture trust deed, or by
virtue of shares issued to it for the purpose in pursuance of
those provisions), directly or indirectly, to appoint the majority
of the directors of that other company,
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“that other company shall be deemed to be a subsidiary
company within the meaning of this act, and the expression
‘ subsidiary company ’ in this act means a company in the case
of which the conditions of this section are satisfied.
“2. Where a company, the ordinary business of which includes
the lending of money, holds shares in another company as security
only, no account shall, for the purpose of determining under this
section whether that other company is a subsidiary company, be
taken of the shares so held.”

Having defined the subsidiary company, the act incorporates
some welcome provisions to insure that members of any parent
company shall be in a fair position to discern how the fortunes of
the subsidiaries are faring.
Legally, prior to November 1, 1929, there was nothing to pre
vent a parent concern from taking credit for all dividends re
ceived from, or profits made by, those of its subsidiaries which
were flourishing, and taking no cognizance of the fact that other
subsidiaries were incurring losses.
The measures now in force to deal with this position require,
first, that on the balance-sheet of the parent company there must
appear a statement, signed by the same directors who sign that
balance-sheet, showing in what manner the profits or losses of
subsidiaries have been treated in the accounts of the parent
company.
In particular, the statement must say how and to what extent
provision has been made for the losses of any subsidiary, and to
what extent, if at all, the losses of a subsidiary have affected the
figure of profit or loss shown as the result of the parent company’s
activities. It is, however, expressly stated in the act that there
shall be no legal necessity to disclose the actual amount of the
profit or loss shown by any subsidiary.
Second, it is expressly required that where the auditors of
any subsidiary have found it necessary to make a report which
contains any sort of qualification then to the next balance-sheet
of the parent company there must be annexed particulars of that
qualification.
It is generally agreed that the act should have gone on to define
exactly what is to be understood by the term “qualification,” as
without such a definition the operation of the above provision can
hardly fail to give rise to dispute.
Perhaps the most welcome of all the changes brought about by
the new legislation, at any rate from the point of view of the
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prospective investor, are those affecting prospectuses and offers
for sale to the public of shares or debentures in a company.
Even under the old law any prospectus issued inviting the gen
eral public to subscribe for either shares or debentures was subject
to severe rules which required full disclosure of all particulars of
the company concerned, its directors, past record and so forth.
Had these rules functioned as they were intended to do, all
would have been well; but they did not. It was not long before
someone hit upon an ingenious idea to frustrate completely their
application.
The method was simple in the extreme. The whole block of
shares would be subscribed by an issuing house, the shares would
be duly allotted, and from the company’s point of view the matter
was finished.
Of course, the issuing house would proceed to sell the shares to
the public, but the circulars, press advertisements and other meth
ods of advertising which were commonly used to bring the shares
to the notice of the man in the street were not within the statu
tory definition of a prospectus, and thus not subject to any of
the formulated rules.
The new provisions have effectively closed this loophole by
extending the definition of a prospectus to include offers to the
public of shares which have been allotted in this way.
Various additions and alterations have also been made to the
rules themselves, but of these only three need be considered here.
When a company was making its first issue of shares, the
prospectus had, under the old law, to name an amount which had
to be received in subscriptions for the shares before the directors
were permitted to make any allotments.
The idea of this minimum subscription was clearly to prevent
the directors from proceeding to allot shares until the amount of
capital taken up was at least sufficient to enable the company to
start its activities properly.
This was another of the sections of the 1908 act for which a
loophole was found, and it soon became a popular practice to name
such a ridiculously low figure as the amount of the minimum sub
scription that the advantage of the provision was entirely lost.
It is now provided that this minimum amount to appear in the
prospectus must be the result of an actual estimate by the direc
tors of the company. An estimate must be made of the pre
liminary expenses of the company, of the cost of any property
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which is to be acquired by the company, and of the amount
required for working capital. The total of these three estimates,
after deducting any amounts which are being provided otherwise
than from the proceeds of this first issue, is the amount of the
minimum subscription.
It has been the custom for many years to include in a prospectus
some sort of a report of the past earnings of the company whose
shares are concerned. But hitherto these reports were not sub
ject to any legal restrictions and no standardization had been
attempted respecting the form in which they were set out or the
period with which they dealt.
An endeavor has been made in the new act to secure uni
formity in this matter, and at the same time to insure that the
information most vital to the prospective shareholder shall be
disclosed.
In the prospectus the auditors of the company whose shares
are being offered must report the profits of each of the three pre
ceding years, and the report must state the rate of dividend paid
for each of these three years with respect to each separate class
of the company’s shares. If in any year no dividend was paid,
this must be plainly stated.
Further, if the proceeds of the issue are to be applied either
wholly or in part to the purchase of any business concern, an
additional report must be included in the prospectus on the profits
of that concern for each of the three preceding years.
It is noteworthy that, while this second report need not be
made by the auditors of the company, the act specifically re
quires that the names of the accountants who are responsible
shall be shown in the prospectus.
The last of the prospectus regulations to be mentioned demon
strates very clearly the attitude of the legal authorities toward
the advertising of shares which come to the public for subscription.
It had become practically the usual procedure for a company
of any magnitude to issue a prospectus of its shares, generally
through the medium of a national newspaper, irrespective of
whether or not it required any subscription from the general
public.
In many cases the prospectus would invite public subscription
in spite of the fact that the issuers of the prospectus had already
previously arranged for the whole of the issue to be taken up by
their friends. It would then happen that those members of the
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public who applied for shares would get their money returned with
a letter to the effect that so great had been the response to the
issue that no allotment could be made. The result of a large
number of letters of this nature invariably caused the shares to
be much in demand, thus enabling the allottees to dispose of their
holdings at a substantial profit!
No doubt, therefore, with the intention of preventing this
method of rigging the market for newly issued shares, the act
now requires every prospectus to state how many of the shares
offered have already been taken up, or have been underwritten
“firm.”
A section of the act which will do as much to prevent roguery
as any other is that which relates to that ubiquitous person,
the share-hawker. This gentleman would earn what was in
many cases a thoroughly dishonest livelihood by the following
means:
Having acquired odd lots of the most worthless shares money
could buy, he would make a house-to-house canvassing trip.
This, in itself, can be open to no objection, but it is to be feared
that the houses to which most attention would be paid, would
be those inhabited by rich and far-too-trusting persons who would
fall easy victims to the plausible lies told by their visitors. Tales
of new oil discoveries, rich seams in forgotten mines, a “certain
merger” that was shortly to be made public, all were part of the
hawker’s stock-in-trade, and would be used without hesitation to
lure money from the pocket of the credulous listener in exchange
for a few shares in a probably defunct company.
Naturally when the victim finally discovered the facts of the
case, it would be far too late in the day to hope for retribution.
However, things will now be changed, and the share-hawker will
now be honest or out of work. The statute has started its anti
hawking campaign with the provision that it is definitely illegal
for any person “to go from house to house offering shares for
subscription or purchase to the public, or any member of the
public.”
In addition to this, written offers are also made unlawful unless
emanating from certain specified sources, and unless accompanied
by various detailed statements regarding the shares offered and
the company concerned.
In relation to these provisions, an amusing suggestion has been
made.
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Instances have already been given of the manner in which loop
holes were found in former legislation and it seems that even
this new act may not be quite watertight. The actual words of
the statute, given above, prohibit the making of “house-tohouse” offers of sale, yet the same section specifically states that
the expression “house” shall not include an office used for business
purposes. (This definition, incidentally, was necessary in view
of the custom of members of the stock-broking community to
approach each other with shares for subscription by means of
inter-office visits.)
It has been suggested by a member of the legal profession that
to go from house to office and office to house would not seem to
be infringing the law, and it remains for someone with a spirit of
bravado to put the matter to the test.
One of the most fundamental changes brought about by the
new act is that machinery is now provided whereby shares may
be issued at a discount. Formerly, while it was permissible to
offer shares for subscription at a premium, it was theoretically
impossible to attract subscription from the public by asking a
price which was below the par value. I say theoretically
with reason, as it was often quite possible to obtain virtually the
same result as if the issue were actually made at a discount by
taking advantage of the provisions permitting the payment of
an underwriting or placing commission.
Incidentally there is good reason to believe that this somewhat
indirect method will still continue to be used in spite of the new
legislation, as the conditions to be complied with before any shares
may be issued at less than par seem rather too strict to find pop
ular favor. It is still not permissible to make an initial issue at a
discount, and to be able to avail itself of the new provisions a
company must have been entitled to trade for at least one year.
Even then, not only must the members of the company au
thorize the issue by resolution, but the sanction of the court is
required.
Moreover, after the permission of the court has been obtained,
the shares must then actually be issued within the period of one
month, and on the face of it this restriction seems to leave rather
an inadequate space of time in which to make the necessary
preparations.
There are many who have remarked in the past upon the
absence from English company law of any provisions permitting
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the issue of redeemable shares of any class. It has even been
said that there was no possibility of a company’s paying back its
capital in any way other than in the form of dividends, or by
going into liquidation.
While it is perfectly true that formerly it was not lawful to
issue shares of a redeemable nature, the idea that capital could
only be repaid by dividends or in the event of liquidation was
totally erroneous. Provision was made, under section 40 of the
old law, for accumulated profits to be paid to shareholders and
treated as a reduction of the amounts paid up on their shares.
It will be seen that this, if carried to its extreme point, at which
the whole of the money paid on the shares would have been re
turned, would give practically the same result as if the shares
were actually redeemable. But there would be one vital differ
ence in that the shares could never be canceled under this section,
for the law insisted that the shareholders must remain liable to
repay the full nominal amount, should occasion arise and a call
ever be made.
This section of the act was seldom used, and it is generally
believed that the reason it became a “dead letter” was the dis
taste, inherent in the general public, for a share on which there
was an uncalled liability.
In the new statute this old provision finds no place, and instead
there appears a section permitting the issue of redeemable shares.
This is not strictly the fundamental change that many would
have us believe, but is merely an up-to-date version of section
40 of the 1908 act, under a new name.
As yet the privilege of issuing shares on a redeemable basis is
limited. Only preference shares may be so issued, and a company
must first have express authority in its articles.
The actual redemption may be effected only in one of two possi
ble ways. The first is out of profits which would otherwise be
available for dividend, and the second, from the proceeds of a new
issue of shares made for the purpose.
It is important to note that at the date of the redemption the
shares to be redeemed must be fully paid up.
The act specifies the accounting entries to be made when the
redemption is effected out of profits available for dividends, and
requires an amount equal to the cost of redemption to be trans
ferred from accumulated earnings and put to the credit of a
separate account to be called the “capital redemption reserve
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fund.” This fund must then be considered as part of the com
pany’s capital, and is, to all intents and purposes, fixed and un
alterable, save for one important exception.
Should there be made to the shareholders a subsequent issue
of bonus shares, it is permissible to use the amount standing to the
credit of this capital redemption reserve fund in paying up the
bonus shares so issued.
A further point worthy of note is that the inland-revenue de
partment has made a concession in regard to these redeemable
shares. When a new issue is made for the express purpose of
redeeming a former issue it is provided that no stamp duty will
be payable on the fresh issue except on the amount, if any, by
which it exceeds the original issue.
In view of the recent announcement from the New York stock
exchange demonstrating its disapproval of the way in which cer
tain investment trusts have been in the habit of dealing in their
own common stock, it is interesting to look for a moment at the
attitude of the English statutes on this point.
Now, as always, it is absolutely illegal for any English company
to become, either directly or indirectly, a shareholder of itself.
But a possible method of evading even this unambiguous ruling
had been found. There was previously nothing which prevented
a company from lending its funds, and still less to prevent the
borrower from buying the company’s shares with the loan!
To put an end to this sort of evasion, the 1929 act has found it
necessary to inquire still further into the details of the loans made
from the coffers of a company. And it is now specifically for
bidden for any company to give financial assistance of any kind,
whether by loan, guaranty, or otherwise, for the purpose of or in
conjunction with the purchase of any of its own shares.
A few necessary exceptions are made, however, as in the case
of a company whose business it is to lend money, and also when
it is the policy of the company to assist its employees to become
shareholders.
As a result of this section auditors may well find themselves
in embarrassing situations, as there seems no doubt that to fulfil
their duties strictly they will now be obliged to inquire not only
as to the authority for every loan but also as to the precise
reason for which it is required.
Everywhere, with the steady march of commercial progress,
has come an increasing number of mergers, amalgamations and
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combines, and England has been no exception to the rule. Small
wonder, then, that the old legal machinery for dealing with such
reorganizations had become lacking in both speed and con
venience.
Among the most essential of the new provisions must therefore
be numbered those which arrange for a more speedy and economi
cal completion of the transfers involved in normal amalgamations.
It was not unusual in the past for much time to be wasted and
much expense incurred on account of a mere handful of minority
shareholders who objected on some ground to the particular
scheme of which the majority was in favor.
While the courts have by no means ceased to protect the mi
nority interests, there is now a rule which prevents any scheme’s
being frustrated or delayed by any minority of less than 5 per
cent. of the shareholders involved, unless, on appeal, the court
is definitely of opinion that the whole arrangement is unfair and
should be set aside. Moreover, this minority can now be com
pelled to sell its shares on the same terms as have been accepted
by the majority.
In addition to this, the court is given the power, when a scheme
for reconstruction or amalgamation comes up for sanction, to
make any order it thinks fit in the particular circumstances. It
may order, for example, that the appropriate assets and liabilities
shall be transferred from the absorbed to the absorbing com
pany, or that the transferor company shall be deemed to be
dissolved.
The immense advantage of such court orders can well be imag
ined, as there ceases to be any need for the normal instruments of
transfer, or the usual formality of liquidation proceedings, and the
saving of both time and expense is therefore considerable.
There remains now one more section of the act to be considered.
The foregoing alterations have related to the joint-stock company
as a going concern, and it is fitting, therefore, to add in conclusion
a few words on liquidation.
Under previous statutes there were, in general, two methods
by which a company could go through this process.
There was the “compulsory” method which involved an appli
cation to the court, and left the liquidator restricted in authority
and obliged to obtain the court’s sanction of most of his actions;
and there was the “voluntary” method, which left the wind
ing-up of the company in the hands of a liquidator whose au
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thority was derived from the creditors and the members of the
company.
Actually there existed still another method which gave the
court part powers of supervision over the liquidation proceedings,
but with this process we are not concerned.
With the compulsory method there was no fault to be found,
and it is virtually unchanged in the new legislation. But the
objections to the old voluntary method were several. Mainly,
they hinged on the question of the extent to which creditors of a
company should be entitled to take part in or control the liquida
tion proceedings.
Under the former law on this point the liquidator in a volun
tary liquidation was obliged to call a meeting of creditors, as soon
as he was appointed, and the extent to which he was controlled by
those creditors was considerable. For example, the creditors
could, if they wished, apply to the court for the removal of the
liquidator appointed by the company and the appointment of
someone else in his place; or they could appoint a committee to
control his actions.
This was all very well when the company was insolvent and
the creditors were therefore justified in wishing to assure them
selves of getting as much of their dues as possible.
But it not infrequently happened that a company, without
being insolvent, wished to wind up by voluntary method for
some reason.
Even in such a case, although there might be not the slightest
doubt that the creditors would all receive their money in full, the
same regulations had to be observed and the creditors exercised
the same extent of control. This was naturally felt to be rather
unfair, and the amending provisions incorporated in the 1929
act were therefore warmly received.
A voluntary liquidation is now divided into two sections: one
for the case of the solvent company and the other for the in
solvent.
To be entitled to come under the first head the directors of a
company about to go into liquidation are obliged to make a
declaration to the effect that, in their opinion, the company will be
able to pay all its debts in full within one year from the commence
ment of liquidation. Having done this, the liquidation may be
carried out as an entirely domestic affair, and the creditors have
no voice in the proceedings.
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Should no declaration be forthcoming, however, the company
automatically falls within the second or insolvent class, and
throughout the liquidation the liquidator is guided primarily by
the creditors and only to a less extent by the members of the
company.
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